Citizens elect local leaders to govern their cities. They naturally expect those leaders to be accountable when roads deteriorate, garbage goes uncollected, drains overflow, public spaces decline, or basic municipal services fail. But this raises a fundamental question: do India’s elected mayors actually have enough authority to deliver the results for which citizens hold them responsible?
In many Indian cities, responsibility and authority do not sit in the same place. Elected municipal governments may be publicly associated with the city’s performance, while important administrative powers, senior officials, finances, or public services remain with state governments, development authorities, or other agencies. India’s 74th Constitutional Amendment created a framework for municipalities as institutions of self-government, but the actual transfer of powers and responsibilities depends substantially on state legislation and implementation.
This creates an accountability problem. When something goes wrong, elected leaders can argue they lacked sufficient administrative authority, while officials or other agencies can point to responsibilities elsewhere. For citizens, it becomes difficult to know who is actually responsible for fixing the problem.
A functioning system of local democracy should connect responsibility with authority. If citizens are expected to hold a mayor accountable for the performance of their city, that mayor should have meaningful executive authority over the municipal administration that delivers those services.
That does not mean politicizing the civil service. Professional officials should continue to be recruited through appropriate processes and protected from arbitrary political interference. But professional independence should not mean an absence of democratic accountability. Senior municipal administrators should work within a clear chain of responsibility under the elected city government, just as professional managers in any functioning institution operate within clearly defined authority.
New York City provides one model worth studying, although India does not need to copy it. Under the New York City Charter, the mayor serves as the city’s chief executive officer and has broad authority over city government administration, including appointing the heads of many departments and agencies. The mayor also has major responsibilities for preparing and administering the city’s budgets and financial plans.
Other institutions balance that executive authority. The New York City Council performs legislative and oversight functions, while professional civil-service protections and institutions such as the Civil Service Commission provide safeguards within the administrative system. The important lesson is not the precise structure of New York government. It is that substantial executive responsibility is accompanied by substantial executive authority, while checks and professional protections remain in place.
India needs to develop its own model suited to its constitutional and administrative structure. Elected mayors should have meaningful authority over core municipal functions, while the responsibilities of municipal, state, and national governments should be clearly defined. Senior municipal officials should have stable professional careers, but a clear line of accountability should also exist between the administration and elected city leadership.
Administrative authority alone, however, is not enough. Cities also need greater financial capacity. If municipal governments are expected to maintain roads, sanitation, drainage, public spaces, transportation, and other infrastructure, they need predictable revenues and reasonable authority to raise, retain, and manage local resources. Decentralization cannot simply shift responsibilities downward while leaving money and decision-making authority elsewhere.
Greater mayoral authority must also come with stronger accountability. Municipal councils, independent audits, transparent budgets, published service standards, public performance data, and other institutional checks can ensure that empowering elected city governments does not simply concentrate power. The objective should be to make accountability clearer, not weaker.
Ultimately, citizens should be able to answer three basic questions about their city: Who is responsible? Do they have the authority to act? And can citizens hold them accountable for the results?
When those answers point to different institutions, accountability becomes fragmented. When responsibility and authority are aligned, citizens have a much clearer way to judge whether their government is working.
India’s cities need professional civil servants, capable state governments, and strong institutional safeguards. But they also need elected city governments with enough authority and financial capacity to actually govern.
Responsibility. Authority. Accountability. They should sit together.
Better Systems. Stronger India.
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